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Abstract 
In this paper, I analyze the development of inter-regional mobility in the Czech Republic during 
the transition from central planning to a market economy. I show that the intensity of migration 
is low and even has fallen during the transition regional disparities in unemployment rates and 
earnings have increased. More importantly, labor mobility is little effective in facilitating labor-
market adjustment to employment shocks. Using aggregate inter-regional migration data and 
survey data on past and prospective migration and the willingness to move. I find that economic 
factor play little role in explaining migration patterns. There is, nonetheless, some tentative 
evidence of the greater importance of economic considerations in explaining future migration 
intentions and the willingness to move. Thus, while at present migration appears more of a social 
or demographic rather than economic phenomenon, its economic role may strengthen in the 
future.  
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1  Introduction 
Inter-regional labor mobility, or migration,
1 is an important economic phenomenon and a crucial 
determinant of regional labor-market developments. As such, it is an interesting topic and fruitful 
object for academic study and policy discussion. Migration in the transition countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe attracted a great deal of attention lately in the context of EU enlargement. 
Ironically enough, the discussion tends to look upon migration from two, very different, angles. 
The first view sees migration as a positive development, indeed as an indispensable channel of 
regional adjustment. This role of migration is particularly important in relation to monetary 
integration in Europe, in which the new members are required to take part sooner or later. Once 
they adopt the euro, the new member countries will be subject to the one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy of the European Central Bank. Most available studies (see Horvath and Ratfai, 2004, 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003, 2004) indicate that the new members’ business cycles are, at best, 
imperfectly aligned with the Eurozone. Unless there is rapid improvement in this respect (as 
envisaged by Babetskii, Boone and Maurel, 2004), the newcomers will require adjustment 
mechanisms other than independent monetary policy to help their labor m a r k e t  d e a l  w i t h  
asymmetric shocks. Labor mobility is such an adjustment mechanism. When the labor force is 
highly mobile and responds readily to labor-market developments, membership in the Eurozone 
will be not be associated with high costs even if the new member countries continue to 
experience idiosyncratic shocks. Somewhat less intuitively, high mobility of labor in the new 
member countries of the EU can also be good also for the destination countries. Europeans in 
general are known to be little mobile. Schuendeln (2004), however, finds that immigrants in 
Germany tend to be more mobile than the natives and also respond more readily to differentials 
in labor-market conditions. As such, immigrants constitute a mobile segment of the labor 
markets and thus can help facilitate adjustment to employment shocks also in the destination 
countries.  
The second view, in contrast, is concerned with the implications of migration for the 
destination countries’ labor markets and public budgets. Once the nationals of the new member 
countries of the EU are free to move to the old member countries, it is feared they will do so in 
large numbers, attracted by high wages and/or generous welfare states (Sinn and Werding, 2001, 
                                                 
1 The terms labor mobility and migration are used interchangeably in this paper.    3
consider the former, Chand and Paldam, 2005, discuss the latter, and Sinn, 2004, analyzes both 
motives). Accordingly, a large enough East-West flow of migrants would destabilize the 
destination countries’ labor markers by increasing unemployment and driving down wages of the 
natives, and would allow the migrants to free-ride on the generous welfare-state provisions in the 
destination countries. Therefore, migration from the new members is a threat, and as such should 
be restricted.
2  
These two views thus arrive at very different conclusions about the merits of migration in the 
context of European integration. Whether migration is seen as a threat or opportunity, 
nonetheless, it is important to know how prevalent it really is. Therefore, in this paper, while I 
refrain from making extensive qualitative predictions about the impact of migration on origin or 
destination countries (see Klailová, 2004, for an extensive discussion of the implications of post-
enlargement migration flows from the Czech Republic to the ‘old’ EU countries), I assess the 
extent of migration and analyze its responsiveness to labor-market characteristics in one 
transition economy: the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is particularly suited for this kind 
of analysis. It is a medium-sized transition economy that has gone from having one of the most 
orthodox centrally-planned economies and strictest communist regimes to becoming a market 
economy, democracy, and a member country of the EU in barely a decade and a half. As such, its 
experience should be similar to (if not representative of) issues and developments encountered 
by most of the other transition countries.  
In the following section, I start my analysis of migration
3 in the Czech Republic by 
discussing some descriptive evidence on the extent of, and the reasons for, labor mobility in the 
Czech Republic I then present results of my empirical analysis of determinants of migration in 
section 3. Finally, I summarize the main findings and draw conclusions from them in section 4.  
 
                                                 
2 It should be pointed out, however, that these fears find little justification in empirical evidence from previous 
episodes of large-scale migration flows. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) survey the available evidence and find that 
immigration has at most modest effect on the host country wages and unemployment. Similarly, most studies 
assessing the impact of the massive immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1990s find that it had 
little long-term impact, if any, on the wages and employment of native Israelis (see, for example, Cohen and 
Paserman, 2004). 
3 A related, and equally important economic phenomenon, is commuting. Unfortunately, as none of the data 
available to me measure the extend of commuting in the Czech Republic, I am unable to consider commuting as part 
of my analysis.    4
2  How Often and for Why Do Czechs Move? 
Whether it is perceived in positive or in negative light, it is generally accepted that migration is 
important, from the point of view of both the region or country of origin and destination. A 
crucial question, therefore, is: How much migration, inter-regional and international, do we see 
in the transition countries? Figure 1 gives an answer to this question based on the official 
migration statistics, which measure migration using records on arrivals and departures in the 
Czech population registry. By law, Czech residents regardless of nationality are requ 
ired to register with the municipality in their place of residence. The migration statistics are 
derived from the changes in the registry; they comprise migration by Czech nationals and 
foreigners who hold permanent and (since 2001) long-term (at least one year) residency rights in 
the Czech Republic.
4  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here.  
 
The official statistics allow us to make three important observations. First, Czechs have 
become increasingly reluctant to move over time, with migration flows falling steadily from the 
high of 130,000 in 1992 until they leveled off at around 100,000 in the mid 1990s. With overall 
population of 10.3 million, this means that in the second half of the 1990s 1% of the Czech 
population changes their place of residence annually. Migration has increased towards the end of 
the 1990s and in the early 2000s, but this increase was almost entirely driven by increased 
immigration from abroad.  
Second, the bulk of migration is made up by flows that largely cancel each other. In other 
words, most regions report a similar inflow and outflow of migrants, so that the resulting net 
inflow is very small. For example, the correlation between gross immigration and emigration 
across the Czech 76 districts (77 since 1996)
5 from 1992 until 2001 ranges between 0.96 and 
0.99. The correlation between gross and net immigration, in contrast, ranges between -0.72 and 
                                                 
4 These figures are likely to underreport the actual extent of migration somewhat, as not all migrants inform the 
authorities of their move, or do not do so promptly. However, since access to some public goods such as healthcare 
and schooling is easier in one’s place of official residence, the official statistics probably give a good measure of 
permanent migration while they may underreport temporary moves.  
5 The districts, or okresy, are the lower-level regions, below kraje (NUTS 3) and oblasti (NUTS 2), and above 
municipalities (obce). The average population of districts was approximately 140,000 in the mid 1990s. There were 
76 districts until 1996, when the district of Jeseník was formed at the expense of Bruntál and Šumperk districts. The 
Czech regional structure was reformed in 1999 and district boundaries were redrawn (while keeping their number 
still at 77). For this reason, migration figures at the regional level up to 1999 and from 2000 are not comparable.    5
0.89, and the correlation has steadily declined during this period (the highest value was attained 
in 1992 while the lowest pertains to 2001). This trend is even more apparent when considering 
only internal migration: while the gross inflows and outflows are again highly correlated, 
between 0.94 and 0.99, the correlation between the gross and net inflows, after reaching its 
highest value (0.73) in 1992, is in fact negative for most of the period (with the lowest value, -
0.77, attained in 1996). This indicates that, for the most part, migration takes the form of 
churning rather than a net flow from depressed areas to those with more favorable labor-market 
conditions (Fidrmuc and Huber, 2004a, and Huber, 2004, also make this observation). This may 
be because most people move for reasons other than seeking employment: family or personal 
reasons (for example marriage, divorce or retirement), university studies, or finding a better 
house. Alternatively, churning may occur also because of reallocation of labor among sectors 
(and regions) due to structural change: traditional industries decline and new ones arise, resulting 
in a mismatch between skills of the resident labor force and the skill requirements of the 
expanding sectors. Such structural change did take place in the Czech Republic during the post-
communist transition; whether it can account for the churning nature of migration flows, 
however, is unclear.  
Third, despite being poorer than its neighbors to the West, the Czech Republic appears on 
average to be a destination rather than a source country of emigrantion: each year, 9-12% of all 
registered migrations come from abroad. It is likely that the official figures underestimate the 
actual extent of emigration (especially for Czech nationals), however, as migrants may fail to de-
register because they expect to return in not-too-distant future, want to keep entitlements to 
residency-based public goods, or they simply do not bother to take the effort to inform the local 
authorities of their departure. Nonetheless, being richer and having a more dynamic economy, 
the Czech Republic was absorbing considerable inflows of migrants from other East European 
countries, especially Slovakia and Ukraine.
6 In addition, the Czech Republic was also a 
                                                 
6 Immigration appears to have accelerated in the recent years. It is unclear, however, to what extend this 
growth is due to methodological changes and to changes in the legal framework governing immigration that both 
took place in 2001. Until then, migration statistics included only permanent residents. Since 2001, foreigners who 
are long-term residents (defined as those holding residence permits for at least one year) are alos considered. This 
broadened the range of migrants included in Figure 1, which may account for some of the increase recorded in 2002-
3. However, stricter eligibility requirements for long-term residency enacted since 2001 caused a large number of 
long-term residents to lose their long-term permits, which accounts for the negative migration balance recorded in 
2001. Unfortunately, migration statistics do not differentiate between foreigners whose visa status changed from that 
of a long-term resident to short-term one and those who actually left the country; both are reported as emigrations    6
destination for migrants from Western European countries. In fact, Boeri and Brücker (2000) 
report, relying on OECD data, that the Czech Republic is one of only two accession-candidate 
countries (the other country being Slovenia) to have a positive migration balance vis-à-vis the 
EU. Besides former refugees who left during the communist period and returned after the regime 
change, an important component of this migration flow are managerial staff and experts who 
come to the Czech Republic along with FDI inflows. 
It is notable that migration has been falling in the Czech Republic on the background of 
rising inter-regional disparities with respect to both unemployment and wages (see also Fidrmuc, 
2004). With increasing inter-regional differentials in labor-market conditions, individuals in 
economically depressed regions can improve their well-being considerably by migrating and 
taking up jobs in regions with low unemployment and high wages. In this way, migration helps 
equalize labor-market conditions across regions. If migration fails to respond to inter-regional 
differentials, on the other hand, labor-market shocks have long-term or permanent effects. This 
issue is analyzed in greater detail in the next section.  
In order to assess the extent of labor mobility in the Czech Republic, it would be useful to 
compare Czech figures with those of the other new and old member countries of the EU. 
Comparing inter-regional migration figures across countries is difficult, however. Regional units 
often differ in size, which may bias the migration statistics: the larger the regions, the greater the 
fraction of migration classified as moving within region rather than between regions. I avoid this 
problem by looking at survey evidence: it relies on two recent Eurobaromenter surveys
7, carried 
out with almost identical questions on past and prospective mobility in the old member countries 
in 2001 and, in the countries that were at the time candidates for membership in the EU in 2002.  
The upper panel of Table 1 reports the extent of past mobility (over the past ten years) in the 
Czech Republic. For comparison, average figures for the ten new member countries, all 13 
candidate countries, and the 15 old EU member countries are also reported.
8 The first column 
reports the fraction of respondents who moved at least once in the past ten years. The second 
column reports the average number of moves (only for those who have actually moved). With 
                                                 
 
7 I am grateful to The Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these data available to us. The survey 
data were collected by means of face to face interviews. Both samples were constructed so as to be representative at 
the national level.  
8 The averages are weighted by population. Country-specific figures are reported in the unpublished Appendix 
available from the author upon request.    7
20% of respondents reporting having moved, and on average moving only 1.3 times during the 
past ten years, the Czechs rank among the least mobile people in Europe: 25% of respondents in 
the new member countries and 29% of those in the candidate countries have moved, while the 
migration rate in the old EU is 38%.  
The rest of the table offers additional information about the distance of migration (note that 
the figures reported in the third to seventh columns are the percentages only among those who 
moved rather than within the entire sample).
9 Here, the Czech Republic comes out in somewhat 
more favorable light: approximately two-thirds of migrations in both candidate countries and the 
EU are within the same town or city whereas in the Czech Republic the corresponding figure is 
54%. Thus, nearly half of all past migrations entails moving over a non-trivial distance. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the remaining moves were within the same region (35%). Only 
a relatively small fraction of respondents moved from another region in the Czech Republic, and 
even fewer moved from another country (1% from another European country and 1.5% from a 
country outside Europe). International mobility is low among the candidate countries in general: 
on average, 1.7% moved within Europe and 0.7% lived in a non-European country (the 
corresponding figures for the new member countries are slightly higher, 2.8% and 1.1%, 
respectively). In contrast, 5.9% of EU citizens previously lived in another EU country and 5.3% 
lived outside the EU.
10  
 
Insert Table 1 about here.  
 
It is reassuring to note that the survey results largely confirm the figures on inter-regional 
migration discussed above. With 46% of Czech population moving to another town or city over a 
ten-year period, and on average moving 1.26 times (assuming the number of moves is the same 
for all types of moves), we can an annual migration rate of 1.2%. This is somewhat above the 
average migration rate of 0.9% obtained with official statistics on inter-regional migration. Some 
of the difference is due to the fact that official statistics only report moves across district 
                                                 
9 Note the slight difference in the wording of the question in the two surveys: the last two categories for the 
candidate countries’ survey are another country in Europe and a country outside of Europe, whereas the 
corresponding categories for the member countries’ Eurobarometer were another EU country and a country outside 
the EU.  
10 This difference, however, may in part be explained by the different eligibility criteria for inclusion in the 
survey. In the candidate countries, only nationals of the country were allowed to participate. For the EU member 
countries, the respondents can be nationals of any EU country, who, in most cases, are themselves migrants.    8
boundaries. The way the survey question is worded, one cannot determine whether those who 
moved from another town in fact moved from another town within the district or from another 
district. Another source of the difference is underreporting of migration in the official statistics 
whereby some migrations are not reported to the population registry. Since the difference 
between the two estimates of inter-regional migration is relatively small, underreporting does not 
seem to be excessive.  
Prospective mobility is more interesting and relevant than the past migration pattern, 
especially in countries undergoing important economic restructuring. The on-going changes may 
give rise to greater or lower incentives to move in the future. This, however, does not seem to be 
the case with the Czech Republic: the patterns of prospective and past mobility are very similar. 
The lower panel of Table 1 presents figures on migration intentions over the period of the next 
five years. 13% of Czech respondents intend to move in the future, which again puts them close 
to the lower bound of their league. In contrast to past mobility, migration intentions are not 
dramatically different across the two groups of countries: on average 19% of respondents of the 
candidate countries (16% in the new member countries) plan to move, compared to 18% of EU 
citizens. With respect to the intended distance of moving, Czechs no longer appear dramatically 
different from either the other candidate countries or the old EU member countries: 46% plan to 
move within the same town or city, compared to 47% among the new member countries and 
52% in the candidate countries and also the old EU countries.  
Prospective mobility differs quite strikingly from past mobility, however, when it comes to 
migrating across national borders. Whereas only a small fraction of Czech respondents lived in a 
foreign country in the past, almost 9% would like to move to another European country and 6% 
to a country outside of Europe. Similarly, 10% of nationals of the new member and candidate 
countries plan to move within Europe and 3-4% intend to move overseas.
11 These figures, 
however, should not be interpreted as a sign of massive future East-West flow from the candidate 
countries. Migration intentions can easily overestimate actual mobility. Note, in particular, that 
respondents in the old EU countries have similarly high intentions to move abroad: 8% plan to 
move to another EU country and 7% to a non-EU country.  
                                                 
11 The country-specific figures not reported here (available upon request) suggest that Bulgarians are 
particularly eager to move abroad, with 36% planning to move to Europe and 21% overseas. The least migration-
prone country is Malta (3% intending to move abroad and none overseas), followed, somewhat surprisingly, by 
Turkey (3% and 2%, respectively).    9
It is instructive to consider also the motives for which people move. Table 2 reports the 
reasons for moving or intending to move. By far, the most important motivation is family 
considerations, followed by housing. The candidates and members are very similar in this 
respect. Importantly, economic motives (whether work or financial reasons) account for a 
relatively small fraction of past migrations: 14.8% of Czech respondents moved because of their 
work and 11% moved because of financial reasons. While it may appear low, the share of work-
related mobility is in fact the third highest among the candidate countries, and ranks high also 
among the old EU members. Economic considerations, however, are expected to play a more 
important role with respect to future migration decisions. Finally, and reassuringly, Czechs 
generally like their neighbors and do not often move because they dislike the people living near 
them.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here.  
 
Before moving on to quantitative analysis of migration patterns, it is instructive to discuss 
also evidence on Czechs’ willingness to move. Willingness to move refers to the respondents’ 
preparedness to move under specific, hypothetical, circumstances of interest. The average 
responses are summarized in Table 3. First, the respondents were asked to indicate their 
preparedness to move in case they were unemployed and moving would improve their prospect 
of finding a job. The interview questionnaire explicitly offered only two alternatives (stay or 
move); however, the interviewers were instructed to accept also it depends responses if offered 
spontaneously.
12 The Czechs are not particularly eager to move even when faced with the 
prospect of remaining unemployed: only 29% indicated they would be prepared to move. Only 
25% are intent on staying, whereas most respondents (32%) indicated it would depend on the job 
they would get if they moved. Czechs thus appear rather reluctant or hesitant to move compared 
to national of other candidate, new member or old EU countries. The next two willingness-to-
move question address the respondents preparedness to migrate abroad: whether they would be 
to willing live in another European country (70% of Czechs answer not at all willing or not much 
willing), and whether they intend to go to live and work in a current EU member country (89% 
answer no, this being the third highest figure among the candidate countries, after Malta and 
Slovenia).   10
 
Insert Table 3 about here.  
 
In summary, the Czechs are among the least migration-prone Europeans. Those who do 
move are quite happy to move within their own country but not internationally. We may see 
more international migration in the future, nonetheless. While only a relatively small fraction of 
past migration was motivated by economic considerations, mobility motivated by work-related 
and/or financial reasons may become more important in the future.  
An argument often brought up to explain the low and falling labor mobility in the Czech 
Republic is the inefficient nature of housing and credit markets, and large inter-regional 
differentials in housing and rental prices. Accordingly, people in depressed regions do not move 
for any from, or combination of, the following reasons: because they cannot afford to buy or rent 
housing in more prosperous regions, because a large part of the housing stock is publicly owned 
or otherwise regulated and therefore cannot be traded freely, and because banks are reluctant to 
provide long-term mortgage loans (and if they do, they may require excessive collateral 
backing). However, the evidence reported by Fidrmuc and Huber (2004b) suggests this argument 
can at best provide a partial explanation of the low mobility in the Czech Republic: they report 
the results of a survey (carried out in 1998) that asked respondents whether they would be 
prepared to move if they were unemployed and were offered both employment and housing in a 
distant municipality. The survey question was thus worded so as to remove the housing 
constraint from the respondents’ decision – yet, 59% answered they would not move and only 
41% were prepared to consider moving.  
 
3  What Drives Migration? 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) in their analysis of regional labor-market dynamics find that labor 
mobility is the primary channel of regional adjustment in the wake of employment shocks in the 
United States. Decressin and Fatás (1995), in contrast, find that European employment shocks, 
for the most part, lead to lower labor-force participation rather than emigration of the surplus 
labor. For an economist, the capacity of labor mobility to facilitate regional adjustment is 
therefore one of the most interesting aspects of migration.  
                                                                                                                                                             
12 The precise wording of this question, and the following two, is reproduced in the footnotes to Table 3.    11
The descriptive analysis in the preceding section shows that: mobility is rather low in the 
Czech Republic despite sizeable regional disparities; much of it is churning flows; net migration 
is relatively modest; and the bulk of moves are motivated by non-economic motives such as 
family or housing considerations. In comparative perspective, Czechs are generally less mobile 
than nationals of other European countries, although the difference is not too dramatic. These 
findings suggest that migration is not very effective at facilitating regional adjustment. In this 
section, I pursue this question further.  
The official migration statistics discussed above can be used to analyze the economic 
determinants of inter-regional migration.
13 The data record gross and net migration at district 
(okres) level from 1992 to 1998, that is, gross population inflow and outflow and net inflow per 
district, without distinguishing the region of origin for the inflows and destination for the 
outflows.
14 Migration rates, i.e. migration as a percentage of the district population, are related to 
labor-market conditions: unemployment rate, average wage, and population density (as a 
measure of congestion and/or urbanization). Because of possible endogeneity of local labor-
market conditions with respect to migration, the unemployment rate and average wage are both 
lagged by one year. To remove the effect of wage inflation, average wages are divided by the 
respective year’s national average wage (the resulting variable is denoted as the wage ratio). For 
migration to be effective at facilitating regional adjustment to shocks, the gross inflow should be 
positively related to the average wage and negatively related to the unemployment rate. The 
opposite should hold for the gross outflow. Correspondingly, the net immigration should be 
positively related to the average wage and negatively related to the unemployment rate. This 
kind of relationship would imply that, on average, people move from depressed regions, 
characterized by high unemployment and/or low incomes, to regions with more favorable 
conditions (unless, of course, high unemployment is compensated by high wages or vice versa). 
If such a relationship holds, migration will help equalize labor-market conditions across regions 
in the wake of employment shocks. Failure of migration to respond to regional labor-market 
                                                 
 
13 See Fidrmuc (2004) for a more in-depth comparative analysis of migration determinants in a number of 
accession-candidate and EU member countries, on which the discussion in this and the following two paragraphs is 
based.  
14 Data on district-to-district flows are also available, however, as the average district size is rather small, a 
large part of flows are either zeros or very low numbers, requiring more complicated econometric modeling (see 
Fidrmuc and Huber, 2004). For the sake of simplicity and tractability, I analyze here a reduced-form relationship   12
conditions, on the other hand, would signify limited ability of regions to absorb adverse effects 
of idiosyncratic shocks, so that unemployment and wage differentials would persist in the long 
term.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. The unemployment rate has the expected 
(negative) sign for both gross inflow and outflow, but only the coefficient for gross inflows is 
statistically significant. This implies that, as expected, regions stricken by high unemployment 
tend to receive fewer migrants, although, contrary to expectation, they do not seem to experience 
higher than average outflow of migrants. The average wage, in contrast, increases both gross 
immigration and emigration. Hence, the data reveal the expected pattern of migration only for 
the gross inflow but not for the gross outflow of migrants. People who decide to move may select 
their destinations with economic considerations on their minds, but economic factors do not 
seem equally important in inducing people to move out of depressed regions. Instead, it appears 
that the bulk of migration is in fact between relatively well-off districts rather than from 
depressed regions to those with favorable labor-market realizations.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here.  
 
The results obtained with net migration reveal a similar pattern: unemployment is negatively 
correlated with net immigration while wages apparently have no effect. Hence, the evidence is 
only partially consistent with migration effectively facilitating regional adjustment to 
employment shocks. Even more importantly, the response of net migration to regional labor-
market conditions, although statistically significant in case of unemployment, is not 
economically significant. In particular, even large unemployment differentials give rise to only 
small population changes: the migration flow attributable to an unemployment-rate differential 
of 10 percentage points only amounts to 0.22% of the district’s population, and a wage 
differential of 100% (i.e. change in the wage ratio of 1) only increases net immigration by 0.07% 
of the district’s population. The speed of adjustment implied by these figures is extremely low: it 
would take years or decades to eliminate even modest labor-market disparities only through 
migration.  
                                                                                                                                                             
with overall inflows and outflows per districts. The analysis reported here is based only on data going through 1998 
because of the change in regional structure in 1999 discussed in section 2.    13
The regional analysis of migration can be complemented by, and contrasted with, a similar 
analysis based on individual data. To this end, I utilize the Eurobarometer survey data discussed 
extensively in the preceding section. Besides giving details on the respondents’ past and 
prospective migration behavior, the surveys contain also a host of information about their socio-
economic characteristics. To analyze individual determinants of migration, I relate the responses 
to questions about past and prospective mobility and their willingness to move to the 
respondents’ individual characteristics. In the light of the preceding discussion about migration 
and adjustment to employment shocks, it is of particular interest to see whether respondents are 
more likely to move when faced with adverse circumstances such as unemployment or low 
earnings. For such individuals, migration can potentially bring about a substantial improvement 
in their wellbeing. Therefore, one can expect that disadvantaged individuals will display higher 
mobility, especially prospective mobility and willingness to move, than the general population.  
The results of logit regressions with past and prospective mobility are summarized in Table 
5. For both types of mobility, I report regression estimates obtained with overall migration first 
and then those based on long-distance mobility (i.e. excluding moves within the same town or 
city), as short-distance moves are least likely to be motivated by economic considerations. With 
respect to finding evidence of economic motivation for migration, the results are disappointing: 
the respondents’ individual characteristics play essentially no role as far in explaining past 
mobility. None of the variables is significant even at the 10% level in the regression with overall 
past mobility, and only two variables – history of past unemployment and living in a city – turn 
out significant in the regression with long-distance mobility. This pattern can be interpreted in 
two ways: either past mobility was uncorrelated with the migrants’ individual characteristics, or 
it was correlated before migrating but the factors instigating the respondents to move were 
annulled by the act of moving (for example, this would be the case if it was mainly the 
unemployed who migrated and most of them found jobs after moving). It is noteworthy that 
individuals who were unemployed before are more likely to have migrated. Given that this 
pattern only obtains for the respondents with a history of unemployment but for not those 
currently unemployed, this is indeed consistent with the unemployed improving their wellbeing 
through migration.  
A stronger result obtains for prospective mobility. Married respondents are less likely to 
intend to migrate, and migration intentions decline also with age (the pattern appears in fact U-  14
shaped, albeit without the quadratic term being significant; the implied trough is at the age of 72 
for overall mobility and 51 for long-distance mobility). Respondents with white-collar 
professional occupations, the self-employed and those with higher incomes are less likely to 
move (however, the last effect is only significant for the third income quartile and only for 
overall mobility): possibly because the relatively well-to-do respondents are contend with their 
current situation and have little incentive to move. Similarly, retirees are less mobile, not 
surprisingly, given that migration is not likely to improve their wellbeing much. University-
educated individuals appear more mobile. Finally, as with past mobility, respondents who were 
unemployed before are more likely to move again in the future. In contrast to past mobility, it is 
the respondents with repetitive unemployment spells who appear more likely to move in the 
future rather than those with a single spell. It is possible that such respondents tend to see 
themselves as being more at risk of becoming unemployed again, or do not see their current 
situation as optimal and intend to improve on it further.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here.  
 
The results of the regression analysis of willingness to move (Table 6) are more interesting, 
given the nature of questions that the respondents were asked. The first question, addressing 
willingness to move if unemployed, offered the respondents three alternative responses (move, 
stay, and it depends. Therefore, this regression is estimated using the multinomial logit method, 
with the stay alternative being the base category. That means that the regression coefficients 
reflect the impact of the various variables on the probability of choosing one of the two 
remaining responses (move or it depends) rather than choosing the base category). The question 
about willingness to move abroad offers four possible responses indicating increasing 
willingness (not at all, not much, to some extent, and very much) and is estimated as an ordered 
logit. The last question, willingness to move to the EU, is estimated using the logit method. 
The determinants of being prepared to move if unemployed and being ambivalent about it are 
very similar with each other, and also do not differ much from willingness to move abroad. In 
contrast, the regression results for willingness to move to the EU are disappointing, with most 
variables below conventional significance levels; this may be due to the fact that less than 11% 
of Czech respondents answered this question affirmatively. As with prospective mobility, being 
married reduces willingness to move if unemployed. Women are more likely to stay. Willingness   15
to move falls with age in a U-shaped pattern, leveling off around the age of 56-57. Gender, 
marital status and age do not affect willingness to move abroad but having children does present 
a barrier to international mobility. Respondents in white-collar employment and the self-
employed are more willing to move if unemployed and to move abroad; those with university 
education or still in university are more likely to move abroad. Interestingly, individuals who are 
currently unemployed are more willing to move abroad but do not display similarly higher 
propensity to move in response to unemployment. Finally, urban dwellers are more willing to 
move both if unemployed and abroad.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here.  
 
Finally, as I argued above, individuals who experience economic hardship should face a 
greater incentive to move. The regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that 
unemployment, either in the past or at present, seems associated with greater mobility although 
the effect is not highly consistent across the different models estimated. To gain a deeper insight 
into these issues, I replaced household income by two alternative measures of subjective 
wellbeing – an indication whether the household income is sufficient to meet its needs, and 
respondent’s assessment of the household’s financial situation as very poor/poor, getting along, 
comfortable, or rich/very rich. The results (which are available upon request) are mixed. On the 
one hand, while self-reported financial situation does not have any bearing on prospective 
mobility, respondents who perceive their household as just getting along, and poor or very poor 
are less willing to move if unemployed and also less willing to move abroad (none of the 
categories is significant with respect to moving to the EU). Thus, it seems that respondents in 
financial hardship are either discouraged from moving or perhaps are unable to move because 
they are liquidity-constrained: that is, unable to bear the cost of moving even if migration would 
help them to improve their wellbeing. On the other hand, a different pattern obtains with the 
income-relative-to-household-needs variable: respondents who feel their household income is 
sufficient or more than sufficient to meet their needs are less likely to be ambivalent about 
moving when unemployed (the impact on being prepared to move unconditionally is 
insignificant), and less likely to move either abroad or to the EU.  
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4  Conclusions 
People move for various reasons: because of family considerations, in an effort to improve their 
housing situation, or because they prefer to live in a specific region, city or town. An important 
aspect of migration, however, is that it is often driven by economic factors such as finding 
employment or getting a higher wage. In this way, migration is a crucial element of labor-market 
adjustment to idiosyncratic employment shocks. When the labor force is highly mobile, the 
effects of regional employment shocks are quickly evened out by migration flows: workers move 
from depressed regions to prosperous ones, until inter-regional differentials in unemployment 
and earnings are all but driven away.  
In this paper, I analyze this economic aspect of migration. Using official statistics on inter-
regional migration, I show that migration in the Czech Republic is low. Even more importantly, 
migration has been falling throughout most of the transition period, even as inter-regional 
disparities in labor-market conditions have increased. This picture is confirmed also by cross-
country survey data on past and prospective mobility, willingness to move in search of a job if 
unemployed, and willingness to live abroad. Within Europe, Czechs rank among the most 
reluctant migrants and generally prefer to stay where they are.  
Not only is migration low in the Czech Republic, it also does not appear very effective in 
facilitating labor-market adjustment. According to my econometric analysis of inter-regional 
mobility, the net migration flow that can be expected to emanate from sizeable inter-regional 
differentials in unemployment and wages is too small to effectively eliminate these differentials. 
Migration does facilitate reallocation of labor in the wake of employment shocks, but the speed 
of this adjustment is very slow. The analysis with individual data delivers similar findings: 
economic factors play little role in explaining migration, especially past migration. There are 
some indications, nonetheless, that economic considerations may play a more important role for 
prospective mobility and for willingness to move.  
The typical Czech prospective or potential migrant – both with respect to internal and 
international migration – is a young person, more often a male than a female, who lives in an 
urban region, has attained university education (or is still a student) and is a highly skilled white-
collar worker or self-employed.
15 In other words, the prospective or potential migrants generally 
                                                 
15 Klailová (2004) arrives at similar findings in the context of potential migration of Czechs to the EU in the 
wake of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU.    17
have favorable human-capital characteristics and are relatively well-off. Importantly, migration 
does not seem to offer a viable path to economic improvement for those who find themselves in 
economic difficulties because they are unemployed and/or cannot make ends meet financially.  
These findings have a number of important implications. First, migration in the Czech 
Republic remains largely a social and demographic phenomenon rather than an economic one. 
Hence, the potential of migration to facilitate labor-market adjustment is limited and therefore 
other tools for mitigating adverse shocks (including autonomous fiscal and monetary policy) will 
remain relatively important in the years to come. Second, the segment of the labor force that is 
mobile mainly comprises workers with favorable socio-economic characteristics. This may be 
because of barriers posed to labor mobility by the inefficiencies of the Czech housing market, or 
because less the well-off potential migrants are prevented from moving by liquidity and/or 
credit-market constraints. If the latter is the case, a continued economic recovery in the Czech 
Republic should increase the mobility of labor – both internally and internationally. Finally, 
inasmuch as Czech Republic’s accession to the EU results in an outflow of labor to the ‘old’ EU 
member countries, the migrants are likely to be relatively highly skilled (see Klailová, 2004, for 
a more extensive discussion). The experience of other countries (see Friedberg, 2000, and 
Eckstein and Weiss, 1998), however, suggests that immigrants from East European countries 
tend to suffer from substantial occupational downgrading in the first few years after immigration. 
Hence, Czech migrants, though relatively skilled and educated, may well end up taking up low 
skilled jobs. If this is indeed the case, EU enlargement will translate into a brain drain for the 
Czech Republic and the other new member countries, without necessarily implying a 
corresponding brain gain for the old member countries.
16  
 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the experience of the UK (one of only three ‘old’ EU member country to allow unrestricted mobility 
of labor from the new members) suggests that most accession countries’ migrants (131 thousand such migrants 
registered for employment in the UK between May and December 2004, including nearly 9 thousand Czechs) indeed 
take up relatively low-skilled occupations in hospitality and catering, agriculture, manufacturing and sales (see 
Home Office, 2005).    18
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Figure 1 Inter-regional Migration in the Czech Republic: 1992-2000 
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Notes: Figures based on the Czech population registry, including both Czech nationals, foreigners with permanent 
residency rights in the Czech Republic, and, as of 2001, also foreigners with long-term residency rights (one year or 
longer). Overall migration is the total number of arrivals, whether from within Czech Republic or abroad. Internal 
migration is arrivals from within Czech Republic, foreign migration is arrivals from abroad. Net migration is the net 
immigration to the Czech Republic.  
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Table 1 Frequency of Past and Prospective Mobility  
Moved in the last ten years 
How 
many 
times? 
Within 
town/city 
Within 
region 
Within 
country 
Within 
Europe 
(EU) 
Outside 
Europe 
(EU) 
Czech Rep.  20.3%  1.26  54.2% 35.0% 15.3%  1.0%  1.5% 
AC10  24.6%  1.57 65.1% 30.4% 13.9%  2.8%  1.1% 
AC13  29.0%  1.78 67.0% 28.5% 14.5%  1.7%  0.7% 
EU15  37.5%  1.80 67.3% 36.0% 20.2%  4.0%  4.2% 
Intends to move within 5 years 
 
Within 
town/city 
Within 
region 
Within 
country 
Within 
Europe 
(EU) 
Outside 
Europe 
(EU) 
Czech Rep.  13.0%    46.1%  27.3% 21.1%  8.6% 6.3% 
AC10  15.6%    46.7% 27.6% 20.0% 10.2%  3.4% 
AC13 19.2%    51.9%  24.7%  21.1%  9.8%  3.7% 
EU15 18.4%    51.5%  30.2%  25.5%  7.5%  6.8% 
Notes: The first column reports the percentage of respondents moved at least once during the past ten years (upper 
panel) and who intend to move during the next five years (lower panel). The second column reports how many times 
those respondents have moved on average. The subsequent columns report on the distance of the move. AC10 stands 
for the average over the ten countries that became EU members in May 2004. AC13 and EU15 refer to the 13 
countries that were candidates for EU membership and the 15 countries that were EU members before May 2004, 
respectively. The averages for AC10, AC13 and EU15 are weighted by population. 
Sources: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Spring 2002 and Eurobarometer 542/2001.  
 
Table 2 Reasons for Moving: Past and Prospective Mobility 
Reasons for having 
moved in the past  
Neighbors, 
people  House  Family 
reasons 
Financial 
reasons  Work Other 
Czech Rep.  3.4%  26.6%  63.1% 11.3% 14.8%  9.9% 
AC10  3.2% 24.8% 57.2% 14.0% 12.6% 13.1% 
AC13  5.4% 25.2% 43.8% 24.0% 18.0% 11.7% 
EU15  3.2% 17.6% 54.1%  8.6% 15.0% 15.8% 
Reasons for 
planning to move 
Neighbors, 
people  House  Family 
reasons 
Financial 
reasons  Work Other 
Czech Rep.  4.7%  36.7%  67.2% 21.9% 27.3% 16.4% 
AC10  7.4% 29.4% 47.0% 25.4% 29.1% 13.0% 
AC13  9.5% 27.5% 34.7% 36.9% 29.4% 11.0% 
EU15  5.1% 15.3% 47.0% 10.1% 27.7% 15.8% 
The respondents were allowed to list multiple reasons. AC13 and EU15 refer to the 13 countries that were 
candidates for EU membership and the 15 countries that were EU members before May 2004, respectively. The 
averages for AC10, AC13 and EU15 are weighted by population. 
Sources: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Spring 2002 and Eurobarometer 542/2001.   22
Table 3 Willingness to Move (WTM) 
WTM if unemployed  Would stay  Would move  It depends   
Czech Rep.  24.9%  29.4%  31.9%   
AC10 35.3%  37.7%  18.1%   
AC13 36.0%  45.4%  11.4%   
EU15 34.0%  37.9%  16.1%   
WTM aboad  Not at all  Not much  To some extent  Very much 
Czech Rep.  50.3%  19.4% 25.9%  4.4% 
AC10 48.6%  17.7%  26.2%  7.5% 
AC13  46.4% 17.7% 22.4% 13.4% 
EU15 45.8%  21.6%  20.5%  8.7% 
WTM to the EU  No   Yes      
Czech Rep.  89.4%  10.6%     
AC10 85.7%  14.3%     
AC13 76.5%  23.5%     
EU15    No comparable question available.     
Notes: AC10 stands for the ten countries that became EU members in May 2004. AC13 refers to the 13 countries 
that were candidates for EU membership before May 2004. The averages for AC10 and AC13 are weighted by 
population. The first panel reports responses to the following question: Please imagine that you are unemployed. 
Which of the two statements comes closest to your opinion?, with the following alternative answers: I would rather 
remain in the same region where I live even if I don’t find a job, or I would rather move to another region to find a 
job. The response It depends on the job I could get elsewhere was not read to the respondents but was accepted if 
offered spontaneously. The second panel presents responses to How willing would you be to live in another 
European country where the language is different from your mother tongue?, with possible responses not at all, not 
much, to some extent, and very much. The question asked in the 15 EU countries replaced another European country 
with another country of the European Union. The third panel reports responses to Do you intend to go to live and 
work - for a few months or for several years - in a current European Union country in the next five years? Source: 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Spring 2002.   23
Table 4 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration, 1992 to 1998 
 Inflows  Outflows  Net Inflows 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Unemployment Rate (lagged)  -0.017 (2.90) 0.002 (0.52) -0.022  (2.97)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  0.462 (2.71) 0.469 (4.16) 0.069  (0.32)
Population Density (log)  -3.864 (5.43) -0.061 (2.18) -4.096  (4.65)
Dummy 1993  -0.188 (9.05) -0.134 (9.45) -0.058  (2.25)
Dummy 1994  -0.267 (13.69) -0.255 (19.04) -0.011  (0.46)
Dummy 1995  -0.288 (13.23) -0.281 (18.87) -0.006  (0.23)
Dummy 1996  -0.343 (15.53) -0.347 (23.01) 0.004  (0.14)
Dummy 1997  -0.305 (14.66) -0.343 (24.03) 0.039  (1.50)
Dummy 1998  -0.227 (10.18) -0.320 (21.10) 0.101  (3.65)
Constant 19.482 (5.67) 1.047 (6.68) 19.781  (4.64)
District Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
District Random Effects  No No No 
R
2 (within)  0.567 0.780 0.124 
R
2 (between)  0.047 0.125 0.056 
R
2 (overall)  0.042 0.325 0.031 
Breusch-Pagan test (p-value)  1022.09 (0.00) 1071.07 (0.00) 290.12  (0.00)
Hausman test stat. (p-value)  48.82 (0.00) 15.90 (0.07) 21.36  (0.01)
Notes: The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and net inflow rate (based on internal 
migration only) as a percentage of the region’s end-year population, respectively. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The number of observations is 518 (74 districts over 7 years, the districts of Bruntal, Jesenik and 
Sumperk are excluded because of changes in their territorial structure as of 1996). The unemployment rate and the 
wage ratio are lagged by one year. 
 
 Table 5 Determinants of Past and Prospective Migration Behavior 
  Past mobility  Past mobility, long-distance  Future mobility  Future mobility, long distance 
Female  0.105  (0.226)  0.189  (0.317)  0.177  (0.364)  -0.072  (0.500) 
Married  0.126 (0.306)  0.116 (0.397)  -1.115*** (0.361)  -1.617***  (0.495) 
Age  -0.092  (0.060)  -0.044  (0.084)  -0.155*  (0.082)  -0.199**  (0.098) 
Age  squared  0.0001 (0.0007)  -0.0004 (0.0010)  0.0011 (0.0010)  0.0019  (0.0012) 
Children  0.132  (0.141)  -0.106  (0.196)  -0.026  (0.248)  -0.223  (0.319) 
HH  Size  -0.141 (0.127)  -0.078 (0.167) -0.260  (0.201)  -0.157 (0.246) 
Secondary  -0.305  (0.471)  0.093  (0.723)  1.372  (1.079)  0.636  (1.035) 
University  0.604 (0.517)  0.647 (0.790) 1.981* (1.135)  1.630  (1.169) 
Student  -1.074  (0.769)  -0.970  (1.151)  0.939  (1.396)  0.465  (1.389) 
Self-employed  0.304 (0.429)  0.469 (0.601) -1.919* (1.081)  Dropped   
White collar  0.171  (0.312)  0.093  (0.434)  -0.954**  (0.467)  -0.566  (0.601) 
House  person  0.541 (0.532)  0.137 (0.637)  -1.070 (0.968)  -1.112  (1.228) 
Unemployed   0.695  (0.523)  -0.506  (0.765)  -0.876  (0.776)  -0.040  (0.927) 
Retiree  0.694 (0.514)  1.096 (0.808)  -3.395** (1.527)  Dropped   
UE History: 1  0.485  (0.332)  0.919**  (0.414)  -0.078  (0.423)  -0.110  (0.559) 
UE  History:  2+  0.679 (0.430)  0.814 (0.527)  1.332** (0.649) 1.704**  (0.862) 
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.036  (0.340)  -0.275  (0.474)  -0.476  (0.486)  0.143  (0.613) 
HH Income 3rd Quartile  -0.429  (0.375)  -0.257 (0.487)  -1.462*** (0.578)  -0.984  (0.824) 
HH Income 4th Quartile  -0.369  (0.384)  -0.016  (0.461)  -0.231  (0.592)  0.387  (0.730) 
Small/Medium  town  -0.062 (0.265)  -0.981 (0.385)  0.882** (0.443)  -0.227  (0.534) 
City  0.356  (0.277)  -0.523***  (0.363)  0.997**  (0.512)  -0.626  (0.803) 
Constant  2.401 (1.461)  0.420 (2.058)  2.683 (2.260)  3.184  (2.261) 
Log likelihood  -285.794    -171.356    -115.691    -70.900   
Pseudo R
2  0.170   0.150   0.356   0.305  
Wald χ
2  87.590***    52.260***    94.550***    51.240***   
No.  of  observations  642   642   558   346  
Notes: Estimated as a logit regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. Past mobility 
takes value of 1 if the respondent reports to have moved once or more often during the past ten years. Long-distance past mobility is constructed analogously but 
excludes those respondents who have moved within the same city, town or village. Future mobility takes value of 1 if the respondents reports to intend to move 
during the next five years. Future long-distance mobility excludes those respondents who intend to move within the same city, town or village. Variables 
indicated as ‘dropped’ were eliminated from the regression because they do not vary with the outcome. The omitted categories are: male, not married or not 
cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, no past unemployment experience, rich/very comfortable/comfortable well-being, and village/rural area.    25
Table 6 Determinants of Willingness to Move 
  Willing to move if unemployed 
  Would move to find job  Depends on the job  Willing to move abroad  Intends to live and work in 
the EU 
Female  -0.758***  (0.245)  -0.479**  (0.244)  -0.232  (0.179)  0.401  (0.464) 
Married  -1.058*** (0.317)  -1.029*** (0.331) -0.057  (0.219)  0.320  (0.586) 
Age  -0.159***  (0.060)  -0.159***  (0.061)  -0.065  (0.046)  0.079  (0.178) 
Age squared  0.0014**  (0.0006)  0.0014**  (0.0007) 0.0003  (0.0005)  -0.0021  (0.0025) 
Children  0.081  (0.144)  0.104  (0.136)  -0.257**  (0.107)  -0.966***  (0.290) 
HH  Size  0.045 (0.136)  0.027 (0.131)  -0.069 (0.106)  0.049 (0.226) 
Secondary  -0.054  (0.437)  -0.158  (0.433)  0.580  (0.407)  -1.890**  (0.950) 
University  0.597 (0.512)  0.168 (0.512)  1.530*** (0.445)  -1.129 (1.222) 
Student  -0.627  (0.979)  -0.567  (0.959)  1.978***  (0.638)  0.520  (1.291) 
Self-employed  1.245** (0.511)  1.727*** (0.489)  0.643** (0.321)  1.058 (0.754) 
White collar  0.772**  (0.328)  1.015***  (0.340)  0.588**  (0.262)  0.327  (0.672) 
House  person  -0.305 (0.755)  0.564 (0.596)  0.528 (0.397)  dropped   
Unemployed   -0.861  (0.562)  -0.715  (0.714)  0.842*  (0.442)  -0.211  (0.917) 
Retiree  0.279 (0.495)  0.242 (0.488)  -0.108 (0.442)  0.310 (1.407) 
UE History: 1  0.644  (0.434)  0.260  (0.429)  -0.108  (0.254)  -0.108  (0.629) 
UE History: 2+  -0.230  (0.442)  -0.557  (0.521) 0.124  (0.299) 0.713  (0.953) 
HH Income 2nd Quartile  -0.109  (0.346)  -0.040  (0.356)  0.505  (0.291)  0.106  (0.908) 
HH  Income  3rd  Quartile  0.306 (0.407)  0.241 (0.408) 0.533* (0.319)  -0.962 (0.923) 
HH Income 4th Quartile  -0.728*  (0.443)  -0.006  (0.436)  0.329  (0.329)  -1.173  (1.063) 
Small/Medium  town  0.666*** (0.265)  0.530** (0.266)  0.198 (0.203)  0.020 (0.498) 
City  1.060***  (0.312)  0.881***  (0.313)  0.534**  (0.239)  -0.165  (0.687) 
Constant  4.135*** (1.525)  3.980*** (1.525)      -0.312 (2.941) 
Log likelihood  -557.287        -585.957    -84.298   
Pseudo R
2  0.089       0.161   0.373  
Wald χ
2  93.840***        184.760***    68.600***   
No.  of  observations  557       627   573  
Notes: The first regression (WTM if unemployed) is estimated as a multinomial logit, with the “would rather not move” response as the base category. The 
second regression (WTM abroad) is estimated as an ordered logit. The third regression (WTM to the EU) is estimated as an ordinary logit. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.Variables indicated as ‘dropped’ were eliminated from the regression because 
they do not vary with the outcome. The omitted categories are: male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, no past unemployment 
experience, rich/very comfortable/comfortable well-being, and village/rural area.   
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